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PREVENTING UNCONSTITUTIONAL GERRYMANDERING: 
ESCAPING THE INTENT/EFFECTS QUAGMIRE 
Robert Farley∗
 
Gerrymandering describes “[t]he practice of dividing a geo-
graphical area into electoral districts . . . to give one political party an 
unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”1  In 
other words, gerrymandering involves aligning electoral districts so 
that the favored political party will receive the majority of votes in a 
majority of districts.  The Supreme Court of the United States has ac-
cepted that gerrymandering is unconstitutional in certain circum-
stances.2  The Court has stated that unconstitutional gerrymandering 
occurs “when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will 
consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the 
political process as a whole.”3  As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
the right to vote is a fundamental right guaranteed under the United 
States Constitution.4  Gerrymandering is therefore undesirable and 
unconstitutional because, according to the Court, “a particular [po-
litical] group [may be] . . . denied its chance to effectively influence 
the political process.”5
Since the Supreme Court first began deciding claims of partisan 
gerrymandering, the Court has consistently struggled to determine 
whether a particular redistricting plan violates the Constitution, spe-
cifically the Equal Protection Clause6 of the Fourteenth Amend-
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. (Psychol-
ogy), 2003, Loyola College. 
 1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (2d pocket ed. 2001). 
 2 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–64 (1964). 
 5 Davis, 478 U.S. at 132–33. 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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ment.7  Today, the Court remains fractured as to whether any man-
ageable standard exists.8
 Gerrymandering rose to the forefront of election law shortly 
after the Supreme Court announced that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires equal population size in the electoral districts within each 
state.9  This rule, known as the “one-person, one-vote” principle, os-
tensibly solved the problem of vote dilution caused by population 
shifts (otherwise known as malapportionment) by requiring equality 
in voting-age population between state and congressional electoral 
districts.10  However, by holding states to that objectively measurable 
standard, the “one-person, one-vote” principle allowed state legisla-
tures to dilute the voting power of certain political groups by organiz-
ing districts to assure that, while each is equal in population size, a 
majority of citizens in a majority of electoral districts represent the 
incumbent political party.11  Such reapportionment, although com-
plying with “one-person, one-vote”, dilutes the voting strength of the 
disfavored party.12
The failure by the Supreme Court to discern a manageable ger-
rymandering standard reflects the difficulty in distinguishing between 
regular, non-partisan redistricting and unconstitutional gerrymander-
ing.  This is primarily because, whether or not a given redistricting 
plan is motivated by partisan concerns, one political party will always 
defeat the other.13  Thus, gerrymandering cannot be objectively 
measured, unlike malapportionment, by the effects of the redistrict-
 7 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006); 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
 8 See Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006); see also infra Part III. 
 9 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–64 (1964) (holding that voting is a funda-
mental right under the Constitution and the “one-person, one-vote” principle applies 
to state legislative electoral districts under the Equal Protection Clause); Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that the “one-person, one-vote” principle 
applies to districts electing members of the House of Representatives under Art. I, § 
2, of the Constitution, which requires that House members be elected “by the People 
of the several States”). 
 10 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (holding that “the Equal Protection Clause re-
quires . . . [apportionment] on a population basis”). 
 11 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Re-
view of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 546 (2004). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (“A group’s electoral power is 
not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme 
that makes winning elections more difficult, and a failure of proportional representa-
tion alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.”). 
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ing plan on elections.  Because of this, the Court continues to strug-
gle with determining when a redistricting plan becomes unconstitu-
tional despite complying with the “one-person, one-vote” standard. 
This Comment proposes that, instead of analyzing the effects of 
redistricting, the Court can much more easily prevent gerrymander-
ing by protecting the process of redistricting and ensuring that there 
is little to no opportunity or incentive to gerrymander for the sake of 
protecting legislative incumbents.  Specifically, the Court should 
adopt an irrebuttable presumption of validity for any redistricting 
done by an independent, nonpartisan redistricting committee.  In 
addition, the Court should hold that mid-decade redistricting14 is pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, allowable only where the State can prove 
a legitimate interest, such as a more accurate reflection in population 
changes, rather than a change in the political party controlling the 
redistricting.  In conjunction, these two changes work to eliminate 
partisan redistricting by creating an incentive to adopt a nonpartisan 
redistricting committee and a disincentive to utilize mid-decade re-
districting, unless related to a legitimate interest, not partisan motiva-
tions.  In this way, the Court can ensure that partisan motivations do 
not influence the redistricting process.  In addition, the Court avoids 
analyzing the effects of redistricting, which has thus far produced no 
manageable standards. 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of malapportion-
ment and analyze the Court’s “one-person, one-vote” standard.  Part 
II of this Comment will review and discuss the Court’s gerrymander-
ing jurisprudence.  Part III of this Comment will analyze the Court’s 
current gerrymandering jurisprudence as compared with its malap-
portionment decisions and discuss why, so far, the Court has failed to 
address adequately the problem of gerrymandering in light of its 
malapportionment jurisprudence.  Part IV of this Comment will offer 
a new solution that avoids the problems associated with the Court’s 
current gerrymandering jurisprudence by focusing on the process, 
not the effects, of gerrymandering, and will discuss the potential vi-
ability and legal ramifications of the proposed solution.  Finally, Part 
 14 The U.S. Census Bureau is required to provide decennial population counts of 
voting districts for the purposes of redistricting. 13 U.S.C. § 141 (2000).  After such 
information is furnished, the public body responsible for redistricting within each 
state must use this information to correct any population deviations between dis-
tricts.  Id.  Mid-decade redistricting, on the other hand, involves the replacement of a 
districting plan enacted pursuant to a census report “in the middle of a decade, for 
the sole purpose of maximizing partisan advantage.”  League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2631 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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V of this Comment will conclude with a summary of the argument 
and proposed solution. 
I. THE HISTORY OF  MALAPPORTIONMENT 
“Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.”15
The Supreme Court of the United States’ malapportionment ju-
risprudence has played a critical role in the subsequent cases dealing 
with partisan gerrymandering.  The Court’s prior analyses in the vari-
ous cases dealing with malapportionment have clearly influenced the 
Court’s current gerrymandering jurisprudence.16  The Court’s focus 
on the effects of malapportionment with respect to electoral districts 
led to the “one-person, one-vote” standard that objectively measures 
whether a constitutional violation has occurred.17  In turn, this has 
led the Court to focus similarly on the objective effects of partisan 
gerrymandering.18  Because of its case-by-case focus on the effects of 
gerrymandering, the Court has failed to articulate an objective stan-
dard to determine whether an Equal Protection violation has oc-
curred.19  In order to understand the problems facing the Court in 
the gerrymandering context, it is important to understand the history 
of malapportionment in the Court, the response of the Court to 
malapportioned election districts, and the constitutional standards 
that the Court has adopted.  The first section of this part will discuss 
the Court’s initial reluctance to decide such cases, and the second 
section will trace the Court’s more recent approach to malappor-
tionment under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Court’s Move Toward Justiciability 
Article IV, Section 4, of the United States Constitution20 states 
that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government.”21  In interpreting this provision, 
the Supreme Court has historically refused to adjudicate claims alleg-
ing a violation of the Guarantee Clause22 and has stated that this 
 15 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1963). 
 18 See infra Parts II, III. 
 19 See infra Part II. 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
FARLEY_FINAL_V2 1/7/2008  6:25:29 PM 
2008] COMMENT 401 
 
 
clause presents a nonjusticiable political issue.23  In Colegrove v. 
Green,24 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, held that a chal-
lenge to a legislative redistricting was a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion.25  The plaintiffs in Colegrove attempted to invalidate congres-
sional districts in Illinois because of the population inequalities 
between districts.26  Justice Frankfurter stated that “[t]o sustain this 
action would cut very deep into the very being of Congress.”27  Thus, 
the Supreme Court was initially adamant in its refusal to adjudicate 
claims dealing with apportionment and districting, despite the pres-
ence of objectively measurable shifts in population and subsequent 
vote dilution.28  However, the Court soon found a vehicle for change 
in the Reconstruction Era Amendments.29
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,30 the Supreme Court reversed the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ complaint.31  The plaintiffs alleged that an act passed by the 
Alabama Legislature deprived them of the right to vote by reappor-
tioning their district to “remove from the city all save only four or five 
of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resi-
dent.”32  Justice Frankfurter, again writing for the Court, held that, if 
disenfranchisement was proved, the plaintiffs would have a justiciable 
cause of action under the Fifteenth Amendment,33 which prohibits 
the states from depriving any citizen of his or her right to vote on the 
basis of race.34  The Court in Gomillion based its reasoning on the ob-
servation that, prior to the legislative redistricting, the district in 
question was shaped like a regular square, but, as a result of the al-
 23 See, e.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Luther v. 
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 24 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
 25 Id. at 556. 
 26 Id. at 550–51. 
 27 Id. at 556. 
 28 Id. at 566–67 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black noted that the population 
range between the congressional election districts in question ranged from 612,000 
to 914,000, and additional districts in Illinois ranged from 112,116 to 385,207.  Id. at 
566.  In addition, Justice Black noted that congressional electoral districts in Illinois 
were last apportioned in 1901, and every Census through 1940 “showed a growth of 
population in Illinois and a substantial shift in the distribution of population among 
the districts established in 1901.”  Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 567. 
 29 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV.   
 30 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 31 Id. at 348. 
 32 Id. at 341. 
 33 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 34 See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341–42. 
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leged legislative disenfranchisement, it was transformed into an ir-
regular twenty-eight-sided figure, which had the effect of “depriv[ing] 
the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence . . . 
including . . . the right to vote in municipal elections.”35  Thus, focus-
ing on the measurable effects of the redistricting plan in question, 
the Court approved federal court involvement in the narrow circum-
stances of racial malapportionment under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.36
Soon afterwards in Baker v. Carr,37 the Supreme Court held for 
the first time that malapportionment cases were justiciable under the 
Equal Protection Clause.38  The district court, relying on Colegrove, 
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint alleging unconstitutional vote di-
lution as a result of district malapportionment.39  In an opinion by 
Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and held 
that such claims were justiciable, not as Guarantee Clause claims, but 
as claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.40  Baker thus overturned Colegrove and opened the door 
for federal court involvement in malapportionment and redistrict-
ing.41
B. An Objective Measurement of a Constitutional Violation: The 
“One-Person, One-Vote” Standard 
Baker v. Carr, however, did not address an important issue: the 
proper standard under the Equal Protection Clause to determine 
whether districts are properly apportioned.  This question was an-
swered in a series of cases, beginning with Gray v. Sanders.42  At issue 
in Sanders was the Georgia state system of electing representatives by 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 345. 
 37 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 38 Id. at 237. 
 39 Id. at 209. 
 40 Id. at 237. 
 41 Interestingly, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion omitted any reference to Jus-
tice Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove, decided sixteen years earlier.  Justice Brennan 
cited the Court’s Guarantee Clause jurisprudence and stated that, while Guarantee 
Clause claims were nonjusticiable, the Equal Protection Clause presented no barrier.  
Id. at 223–24.  Justice Brennan failed to mention that Colegrove spoke directly to the 
equal protection issue and had held that malapportionment claims were nonjusticia-
ble under the Equal Protection Clause.  See Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 
85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1717–18 (1999). 
 42 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
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county.43  In particular, similar to the federal Electoral College, can-
didates for election had to receive a majority of “county votes,” where 
each county was given a certain number of votes based on population 
size.44  The Court held that the inequality in population size between 
counties was unconstitutional because it diluted the voting strength 
of individuals living in more populous counties.45  Writing for the 
Court, Justice Douglas asked: “How then can one person be given 
twice or 10 times the voting power of another person in a statewide 
election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in 
the smallest rural county?”46  The disparity of voting power between 
counties influenced the Court’s decision, as Justice Douglas noted 
that a single county vote for a candidate in one county represented 
938 citizens, while in another county a single vote represented 92,721 
citizens.47  The Court then articulated the standard that governs such 
claims: Once the electoral district in question is identified, every elec-
tion participant located inside the district must have an equal vote.48  
In other words, electoral districts must be drawn in such a way that 
each district is equal in population size. 
The next year, in Wesberry v. Sanders,49 the Court applied the 
“one-person, one-vote” principle to invalidate a state statute providing 
electoral districts for the House of Representatives.50  Justice Black, 
writing for the Court, noted that one electoral district contained 
823,680 citizens, while another contained only 272,154 citizens.51  Be-
cause there was one congressman for each district, the Court rea-
soned that the votes of the citizens living in the more populous dis-
tricts were worth less than those living in the less populous districts.52  
The Court held that Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution,53 which 
provides that “Representatives shall be chosen ‘by the People of the 
several States’ and shall be ‘apportioned among the several States . . . 
according to their respective Numbers,’”54 means “one-person, one-
 43 Id. at 370–71. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 379. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 371. 
 48 Sanders, 372 U.S. at 379. 
 49 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 50 Id. at 7–8. 
 51 Id. at 2. 
 52 Id. at 8. 
 53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 54 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17. 
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vote.”55  “To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in an-
other would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of de-
mocratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of 
Representatives elected ‘by the People’ . . . .”56  Thus, the Court in-
validated the electoral scheme because it failed to comply with the 
“one-person, one-vote” principle in electing members of the House of 
Representatives.57
Finally, in Reynolds v. Sims,58 the Court refined its “one-person, 
one-vote” standard in the context of state legislative districts.59  At is-
sue in Reynolds was the apportionment of state legislative electoral dis-
tricts, where Alabama’s thirty-five Senate districts varied in population 
size from 15,417 citizens to more than 600,000 citizens.60  In addition, 
Alabama’s House of Representatives consisted of 100 elected officials 
from districts varying in size from 13,462 citizens to 634,864 citizens.61  
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, broadly held that popula-
tion size was the only permissible criterion for drawing electoral dis-
tricts.62  “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres.  Legislators 
are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”63  
Furthermore, Chief Justice Warren noted that “[t]he resulting dis-
crimination against those individual voters living in disfavored areas is 
easily demonstrable mathematically.  Their right to vote is simply not 
the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the 
state.”64  Thus, the Court solidified the “one-person, one-vote” princi-
ple as the objective measure of equal protection for voting rights be-
tween state electoral districts.65
Since Reynolds, the Court has consistently reaffirmed the “one-
person, one-vote” principle in a variety of settings.66  Seldom has the 
 55 Id. at 18. 
 56 Id. at 8. 
 57 Id. at 18. 
 58 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 59 Id. at 568. 
 60 Id. at 545–46. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 562. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563. 
 65 Id. at 568 (“Simply stated, an individual’s right to vote for state legislators is un-
constitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when 
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”). 
 66 See generally Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying the prin-
ciple to elected junior college governing body); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 
474 (1968) (applying the principle to elected county commissioners). 
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Court wavered from requiring population equality between electoral 
districts.67  The principle itself addressed a fundamental problem fac-
ing the courts: population shifts created an extreme imbalance that 
led to malapportionment of electoral districts, but incumbents were 
unlikely to change the districts and essentially vote for their own re-
moval.68  After Baker v. Carr,69 the Supreme Court mandated that elec-
toral districts be drawn to reflect population equality so that each in-
dividual’s vote is weighted the same as every other individual within 
the state.70  The Court objectively assessed whether the Equal Protec-
tion Clause had been violated simply by comparing the effects of a 
given redistricting plan: the population sizes between state electoral 
districts.71  Even prior to Baker, the Court used an objective “effects” 
analysis to invalidate a redistricting plan in Gomillion.72  Districts be-
came equal according to population, but they also became necessarily 
more unnatural in appearance.  Soon, legislatures began to exploit 
this to their advantage. 
II. THE HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING 
“[T]he majority has wholly failed to reckon with  
what the future may hold in store . . . .”73
The Supreme Court has stated that partisan gerrymandering 
may violate the Equal Protection Clause where a particular group is 
 67 Generally speaking, precise mathematical equality is not required, although 
there must be “a good-faith effort to achieve” such equality.  Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 
394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969).  In Kirkpatrick, the Court invalidated a redistricting plan 
whereby the greatest deviations from mathematical equality were 3.13% above and 
2.83% below.  Id. at 528–29.  In Karcher v. Daggett, the Court invalidated a redistrict-
ing plan whereby the greatest deviation between districts was 0.7%.  462 U.S. 725, 
732 (1983).  However, the Court has allowed deviations under limited circumstances.  
See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (allowing system for electing water recla-
mation district directors to apportion voting power among certain landowners ac-
cording to the amount of land owned). 
 68 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 852–53 
(2d ed. 2002). 
 69 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 70 See supra Part I.B. 
 71 See id.  This solution was a fundamental shift in the nature of apportionment, 
as districts had previously been drawn using natural boundaries: “In order to bring 
legislative districts as close to [one-person, one-vote] as possible, states must disre-
gard preexisting political boundaries such as cities, townships, and counties.  Adher-
ence to these traditional boundaries was, historically, the principal constraint on 
creative districting . . . .”  Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mis-
takes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 103 (2000).   
 72 See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 73 Baker, 369 U.S. at 339 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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“denied its chance to effectively influence the political process.”74  
The Court’s justification for involvement in this area thus rests on 
similar principles as the Court’s justification for adjudicating claims 
of malapportionment: the Equal Protection Clause requires that an 
individual’s right to vote be given meaning in the sense that the fun-
damental right to vote cannot be abridged through the districting 
process if the result is that participation in elections nears a mere 
formality.75  As discussed above, malapportionment denies voters in 
more populous districts a chance to influence the political process as 
effectively as those in other districts.76  The Court remedied this con-
cern by requiring population equality between districts.77  Unlike 
malapportionment, the effects of partisan gerrymandering are not 
easily measurable for purposes of determining whether an equal pro-
tection violation exists.  The measurable effects of partisan gerry-
mandering are the opportunistic inclusion and exclusion in various 
electoral districts of certain voters based on their political affiliation.  
However, the very nature of elections assumes that one political party 
will prevail over the other in any individual election because the 
amount of voters associated with each party will vary among various 
districts.  “Difficult as the issues engendered by Baker v. Carr may have 
been, nothing comparable to the mathematical yardstick used in ap-
portionment cases is available to identify the difference between 
permissible and impermissible adverse impacts on the voting strength 
of political groups.”78  Thus, the Court cannot measure the effects of 
partisan gerrymandering simply by examining the amounts of Repub-
lican and Democrat voters as it could with the population differences 
between each district.  The following section will, in light of this diffi-
culty, discuss the Court’s approach to measuring the effects of parti-
san gerrymandering on election districts in order to determine when 
the Equal Protection Clause has been violated. 
 74 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132–33 (1986).  “[A]n equal protection viola-
tion may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain 
voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively.”  Id. at 133. 
 75 See id. at 119 (stating “districting that would ‘operate to minimize or cancel out 
the voting strength of . . . political elements of the voting population’ . . . raise[s] a 
constitutional question”) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (em-
phasis omitted)). 
 76 See supra Part I. 
 77 Id. 
 78 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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A. Searching for a Measurable Standard of Gerrymandering 
Initially, the Court stressed its reluctance to invalidate districts 
drawn on the basis of political affiliation: in Gaffney v. Cummings,79 ten 
years after Gray v. Sanders,80 the Court reversed a lower court’s invali-
dation of districts drawn to reflect Connecticut’s statewide political 
strength.81  That is, each district was drawn to reflect the proportion 
of Democrat and Republican voters across the state.82  The Court ex-
pressly recognized the right of the legislature to take political factors 
into consideration when reapportioning districts according to the 
“one-person, one-vote” principle.83 Although the Court attempted to 
draw a distinction between legitimately recognizing the respective po-
litical strengths of a state’s party system and eliminating one party’s 
political strengths,84 the Court ultimately took a passive approach to 
political redistricting: 
District lines are rarely neutral phenomena.  They can well de-
termine what district will be predominantly Democratic or pre-
dominantly Republican, or make a close race likely.  Redistricting 
may pit incumbents against one another or make very difficult the 
election of the most experienced legislator.  The reality is that dis-
tricting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political 
consequences. 
     . . . . 
     . . . [J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State 
purports fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accor-
dance with their voting strength and, within quite tolerable limits, 
succeeds in doing so. . . . [The courts do not] have a constitu-
tional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable 
population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or 
eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to rec-
ognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of propor-
tional representation in the legislative halls of the State.85
The Court again took up the gerrymandering issue thirteen 
years later in Davis v. Bandemer.86  In Davis, the Court considered an 
 79 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
 80 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment embodies the “one-person, one-vote” standard with respect 
to state legislative electoral districts). 
 81 Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754. 
 82 Id. at 753. 
 83 See id. at 754. 
 84 See id. 
 85 Id. at 753–54. 
 86 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
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issue distinct from Gaffney, namely, the redistricting of the legislature 
on political grounds by the incumbents for the purpose of retaining 
control.87  The Republican majority of the Indiana state legislature 
reapportioned the electoral districts in order to keep a republican 
majority in office.88  The Democrats sued, and the district court held 
the plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.89  On 
appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court found such gerrymandering 
claims justiciable: 
     The issue here is of course different from that adjudicated in 
Reynolds.  It does not concern districts of unequal size.  Not only 
does everyone have the right to vote and have his vote counted, 
but each elector may vote for and be represented by the same 
number of lawmakers.  Rather, the claim is that each political 
group in a State should have the same chance to elect representa-
tives of its choice as any other political group.  Nevertheless, the 
issue is one of representation, and we decline to hold that such 
claims are never justiciable.90
Despite this finding of justiciability, the Court ultimately dis-
missed the action without a majority opinion on any other issue.  Jus-
tice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, 
opined for reversal on the grounds that the district court’s test was 
insufficient.91  The district court had held that the plaintiffs “need 
only show that their proportionate voting influence has been ad-
versely affected.”92  The plurality stated that such a test was not re-
quired by the Constitution.93  Instead, the plurality would have re-
quired the plaintiffs “to prove both intentional discrimination against 
an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on 
that group.”94  However, mere disproportionate influence was an in-
sufficient standard to determine discrimination.95  Instead, there 
must be a “substantially greater showing of adverse effects than a 
mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of un-
constitutional vote dilution.”96
 87 Id. at 114. 
 88 Id. at 115. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 124. 
 91 Id. at 143 (plurality opinion). 
 92 Davis, 478 U.S. at 130. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. at 127. 
 95 Id. at 130. 
 96 Id. at 131. 
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Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist, affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that partisan ger-
rymandering claims are nonjusticiable and such issues should be left 
“to the legislative branch as the Framers of the Constitution unques-
tionably intended.”97  Justice O’Connor would have held all such 
claims as nonjusticiable political questions because to hold otherwise 
would eventually lead to a requirement of “simple proportionality as 
the standard for measuring the normal representational entitlements 
of a political party.”98  Justice O’Connor recognized: 
[T]he individual’s right to vote does not imply that political 
groups have a right to be free from discriminatory impairment of 
their group voting strength.  Treating the vote dilution claims of 
political groups as cognizable would effectively collapse the “fun-
damental distinction between state action that inhibits an individ-
ual’s right to vote and state action that affects the political 
strength of various groups that compete for leadership in a de-
mocratically governed community.”99
Justices Powell and Stevens agreed with Justice White’s plurality 
as to the appropriate standard with which to adjudicate such claims, 
but disagreed with the finding that there was no equal protection vio-
lation.100  Justice Powell articulated the view that “the merits of a ger-
rymandering claim must be determined by reference to the configu-
rations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, 
and other criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of 
redistricting.”101  In Justice Powell’s opinion, the most important con-
sideration with respect to gerrymandering claims is the “shape[] of 
voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision 
boundaries.”102
In Vieth v. Jubelirer,103 the Supreme Court was again faced with a 
partisan gerrymandering claim, this time from Pennsylvania where 
the Republican majority adopted a redistricting plan protecting its 
majority.104  Democratic voters sued, claiming that the reapportion-
 97 Id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 98 Davis, 478 U.S. at 157. 
 99 Id. at 150–51 (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)). 
 100 Id. at 161–62 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 101 Id. at 165. 
 102 Id. at 173. 
 103 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 104 Id. at 272. 
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ment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.105  The Court in Vieth 
remained fractured with respect to the justiciability question as well 
as the applicable standard with which to adjudicate such claims.106  
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, concluded that Davis should 
be overturned, as the Court had wholly failed to discover any “judi-
cially discernable and manageable standards by which political ger-
rymander cases are to be decided,”107 as required under the six-part 
test of Baker.108  Justice Scalia noted that, since Davis, “[t]he lower 
courts have lived with [the] assurance [that a] standard [exists] (or 
more precisely, lack of assurance that there is no standard), coupled 
with that inability to specify a standard, for the past 18 years.”109
     Eighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show 
for it justify us in revisiting the question whether the standard 
promised by Bandemer exists. . . . [N]o judicially discernable and 
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering 
claims have emerged.  Lacking them, we must conclude that po-
litical gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer 
was wrongly decided.110
Justice Scalia reviewed a number of lower court decisions and 
concluded that the plurality’s two-part test in Bandemer requiring 
proof of both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect on an 
identifiable political group had been wholly unworkable against 
 105 Id. 
 106 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267–368.  
 107 Id. at 278 (plurality opinion) (quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 123). 
 108 See id. at 277–78.  Baker v. Carr set out six independent tests for determining 
whether a political question exists: 
“[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s under-
taking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of the government; or [5] an unusual need 
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or 
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.” 
Id. at 277–78 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  Although Justice 
Scalia’s plurality opinion focused on the second test, he noted in his opinion that the 
Framers of the Constitution had explicitly provided a remedy for claims such as ger-
rymandering in Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution.  Id. at 275.  This provision, 
“while leaving in state legislatures the initial power to draw districts for federal elec-
tions, permitted Congress to ‘make or alter’ those districts if it wished.”  Id. 
 109 Id. at 279. 
 110 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion). 
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claims of gerrymandering.111  Addressing the appellants’ proposed 
standards, Justice Scalia highlighted the analytical differences be-
tween the “one-person, one-vote” rule and the issue of political ger-
rymandering: 
     Our one-person, one-vote cases . . . have no bearing upon this 
question, neither in principle nor in practicality.  Not in princi-
ple, because to say that each individual must have an equal say in 
the selection of representatives, and hence that a majority of indi-
viduals must have a majority say, is not at all to say that each dis-
cernible group, whether farmers or urban dwellers or political 
parties, must have representation equivalent to its numbers.  And 
not in practicality, because the easily administrable standard of 
population equality adopted by Wesberry and Reynolds enables 
judges to decide whether a violation has occurred (and to remedy 
it) essentially on the basis of three readily determined factors—
where the plaintiff lives, how many voters are in his district, and 
how many voters in other districts; whereas requiring judges to 
decide whether a districting system will produce a statewide ma-
jority for a majority party casts them forth upon a sea of impon-
derables, and asks them to make determinations that not even 
election experts can agree upon.112
Thus, Justice Scalia and the plurality recognized not only that malap-
portionment and gerrymandering are distinct constitutional harms, 
but also that the standard of measuring malapportionment is inappli-
cable to determining whether an unconstitutional gerrymander ex-
ists. 
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, would have held that gerry-
mandering claims are justiciable and believed that the standards gov-
erning racial gerrymandering should similarly apply to claims against 
partisan gerrymandering.113  Justice Stevens’s standard would focus 
 111 See id.  Justice Scalia also rejected the appellant’s similar proposed standard of 
proving discriminatory intent and effect by showing that “the mapmakers acted with 
a predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage . . . shown by direct evidence or by 
circumstantial evidence that other neutral and legitimate redistricting criteria were 
subordinated to the goal of achieving partisan advantage.”  Id. at 284. 
 112 Id. at 290 (internal citations omitted). 
 113 See id. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 
(1993), the Supreme Court held that 
a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though 
race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything 
other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the ba-
sis of race . . . . 
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on the effects of redistricting as well as the “predominant intent” be-
hind the legislative districting plan: 
     The racial gerrymandering cases therefore supply a judicially 
manageable standard for determining when partisanship, like 
race, has played too great of a role in the districting process. . . . If 
. . . the predominant motive of the legislators who designed [a 
district], and the sole justification for its bizarre shape, was a pur-
pose to discriminate against a political minority, that invidious 
purpose should invalidate the district.114
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg in dissent, would also 
have held that such claims are justiciable and would invalidate politi-
cally drawn districts if the plaintiffs met the burden of proving a five-
element test.115  Justice Souter’s test requires the plaintiff to show (1) 
that he or she belonged to a “cohesive political group . . . which 
would normally be a major party”; (2) that the legislature ignored 
other, permissible factors in drawing the district in question; (3) a 
“correlation[] between the district’s deviations from traditional dis-
tricting principles and the distribution of the population of his 
group”; (4) a hypothetical district less egregious than the district in 
question that includes the plaintiff’s residence and “deviate[s] less 
from traditional districting principles than the actual district”; and 
(5) “that the defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape 
of the district.”116  Once the plaintiff has proved these elements, Jus-
tice Souter would shift the burden to the defendants to rebut the evi-
dence by showing some permissible justification for the districting 
plan in question.117
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the limits on ger-
rymandering in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.118  Fol-
lowing the 2000 census, Texas implemented a redistricting plan for 
its congressional electoral districts.119  Then in 2003, the newly 
elected Republican majority implemented a mid-decade redistricting 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 
(1995), the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Shaw and held that a district’s irra-
tional or bizarre shape was “persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own 
sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and control-
ling rationale in drawing its district lines.”  Id. 
 114 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 115 See id. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 116 Id. at 347–50. 
 117 Id. at 351. 
 118 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
 119 Id. at 2605–06 (plurality opinion). 
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plan.120  The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the mid-
decade redistricting plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerryman-
der under the Equal Protection Clause.121
In Perry, a majority of the Court affirmed that gerrymandering 
claims are justiciable under Davis, notwithstanding the plurality opin-
ion in Vieth.122  The Court issued no other majority opinion with re-
spect to political gerrymandering.123  Justice Kennedy’s plurality opin-
ion rejected the notion that mid-decade redistricting is 
unconstitutional, even when it is done for purely partisan motivations 
immediately after a new political majority is elected.124  Joined by Jus-
tices Souter and Ginsberg, Justice Kennedy concluded: 
[W]e disagree with appellants’ view that a legislature’s decision to 
override a valid, court-drawn plan mid-decade is sufficiently sus-
pect to give shape to a reliable standard for identifying unconsti-
tutional political gerrymanders.  We conclude that appellants 
have established no legally impermissible use of political classifi-
cations.  For this reason, they state no claim on which relief may 
be granted . . . .125
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, would have 
held that mid-decade redistricting for solely partisan purposes states a 
justiciable claim.126  In opposition to Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens 
stated his belief that “courts can easily identify the motive for redis-
tricting when the legislature is under no legal obligation to act.”127  
Justice Stevens would require an individual with standing128 “to prove 
both improper purpose and effect.”129  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, would have held gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable con-
sistent with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Vieth.130
 120 Id.  For an explanation of mid-decade redistricting, see supra note 14. 
 121 See id., at 2607 (plurality opinion). 
 122 Id. 
 123 The Court did, however, conclude by a five-to-four margin that one of the dis-
tricts was violative of section two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 
1973(b), which prohibits, among other things, racial gerrymandering.  Id. at 2612–
24. 
 124 Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality opinion). 
 125 Id. at 2612. 
 126 See id. at 2626 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 127 Id. at 2632. 
 128 For purposes of standing, Justice Stevens would require a plaintiff “to prove 
that he is either a candidate or a voter who resided in a district that was changed by a 
new districting plan.”  Id. at 2642 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  
 129 Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2642. 
 130 Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Thus, although the Court repudiated the plurality’s opinion in 
Vieth, it broke no new ground with respect to manageable standards 
for gerrymandering claims.  In addition, the Court’s fracture con-
cerning mid-decade redistricting is indicative of the Court’s larger 
problem of discerning factors to determine when a reapportionment 
plan crosses the line into an unconstitutional gerrymander. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Incompatibility of the Intent/Effects Test with Respect to 
Partisan Gerrymandering Claims 
The Supreme Court’s difficulty in finding manageable standards 
with which to judge claims of gerrymandering stems from the rela-
tionship between gerrymandering and malapportionment and the 
fact that the Court is constrained by the “one-person, one-vote” re-
quirement.  Although gerrymandering has been around for centu-
ries, it was considered until recently to be beyond the scope of federal 
court jurisdiction.131  After the Supreme Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires electoral districts comply with the “one-
person, one-vote” requirement, the courts began judicial oversight of 
regularly occurring legislative redistricting in order to assure compli-
ance with this standard.132  This invariably meant drawing districts 
somewhat artificially, without regard to natural boundaries that had, 
to a certain extent, previously defined districts.133  The Court’s will-
ingness to tolerate artificial districts and regularly occurring redis-
tricting by legislatures, in order to fulfill the “one-person, one-vote” 
requirement, allowed the legislatures to define their districts along 
partisan lines by elevating population equality above all other consid-
erations. 134
The Court recognized as much when it stated the possibility that 
an “apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular 
case, [could] operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength 
 131 See Whitney M. Eaton, Where Do We Draw the Line? Partisan Gerrymandering and 
the State of Texas, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193–94 (2006). 
 132 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 133 See McConnell, supra note 71, at 103. 
 134 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 546 (“Precisely because it elevates equal-
ity of population over all other criteria, one person, one vote can serve as a smoke-
screen for politically driven deviations from other districting principles.  When it 
comes to district-level entrenchment, the necessity of tinkering with the lines every 
ten years can turn into an opportunity to redraw districts to shore up incumbents 
who otherwise might face defeat.”). 
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of racial or political elements of the voting population.”135  Thus, 
Chief Justice Warren’s holding in Reynolds that population size is the 
only permissible criterion for drawing election districts paved the way 
for incumbents to protect their seats, themselves protected by the 
shield of “one-person, one-vote.”136
The Supreme Court’s requirement of “one-person, one-vote” in 
Reynolds was a graceful solution to a particularly egregious problem.137  
The requirement is an objectively measurable standard by which to 
judge whether a constitutional violation has occurred.  Specifically, a 
districting plan is unconstitutional if it deviates from that require-
ment to an impermissible extent.138  Ironically, while judicial in-
volvement was arguably necessary for malapportionment, as incum-
bents would naturally be reluctant to vote themselves out of office, 
incumbents now protect themselves through the same legislative re-
districting that Reynolds requires, albeit with ulterior motives: “If new 
 135 Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); see also Kristina Betts, Redistricting: 
Who Should Draw the Lines? The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission as a Model 
for Change, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 171, 177 (2006), noting that: 
     Under the theory of separation of powers, redistricting falls within 
the power of the legislature, which creates yet another political issue.  
Although many state statutes bar legislators from drawing maps to pro-
tect incumbents, the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit this practice. 
The problem with allowing legislators or legislative committees to draw 
their own maps to protect incumbents is that legislators have an inher-
ent vested interest in the redistricting process because they want to re-
tain their seats. Under certain circumstances, it is inevitable that the 
majority party will strive to protect its advantage. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 136 See McConnell, supra note 71, at 103 (stating that once the Court decided Rey-
nolds, “legislative line-drawers were able to draw maps to produce the results they de-
sired, rendering elections less a reflection of popular opinion than of legislative 
craftsmanship”); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (noting that “nothing comparable to the mathematical yardstick used in 
apportionment cases is available to identify the difference between permissible and 
impermissible adverse impacts on the voting strength of political groups”). 
 137 See Michael Weaver, Uncertainty Maintained: The Split Decision over Partisan Ger-
rymanders in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1273, 1292 (2005) (noting that 
“[t]he one person, one vote principle dramatically corrected the [population] devia-
tions in congressional districts, and nullified a majority of states’ electoral district 
maps”); see also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 544, stating: 
     The central vice presented by [the malapportionment cases] was 
minority entrenchment.  Many states had last redrawn state legislative 
boundaries at the turn of the twentieth century, and their legislatures 
had become backwater relics of past political deals, controlled by law-
makers from rural hamlets in decline whose reactionary politics sty-
mied the interests of voters in the burgeoning cities and suburbs. 
Id. 
 138 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
FARLEY_FINAL_V2 1/7/2008  6:25:29 PM 
416 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:397 
 
 
districts must be drawn,” the majority party thinks, “what is there to stop us 
from drawing them so as to create a majority of our political party in a major-
ity of those districts, all the while keeping with one-person, one-vote?”139  The 
Supreme Court’s attempt to discern between such invidious motiva-
tion and legitimate majority victories is the crux of the problem with 
the Court’s current gerrymandering jurisprudence.140  The only 
agreement between all nine Justices in Vieth was that eventually ex-
treme partisan redistricting is unconstitutional.141  The disagreement 
concerns the standards for measuring when redistricting crosses the 
line from constitutional to unconstitutional.142
As evident from the discussion in Parts II and III, those Justices 
that would hold gerrymandering claims justiciable take their cue 
from the malapportionment cases and inquire as to the effects of re-
districting.143  However, the effects of gerrymandering cannot be ob-
jectively measured and distinguished from politically neutral redis-
tricting.144  In the malapportionment cases, the measure of the effect 
of redistricting was also the measure of the equal protection violation: 
interdistrict population inequality.145  In contrast, gerrymandering 
 139 See, e.g., Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistrict-
ing, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1046 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he easiest feasible stan-
dard to use for partisan one person, one vote deviations is the standard set for parti-
san gerrymandering . . . . Constitutionally speaking, gerrymandering is the closest 
cousin to one person, one vote violations, as they both involve the manipulation of 
voting districts toward a political end, and come under equal protection scrutiny as a 
result.”). 
 140 See Erika Lewis, Trailblaze or Retreat? Political Gerrymandering After Vieth v. Jube-
lirer, 27 HAW. L. REV. 269, 293 (2004) (noting that “the search for judicially manage-
able and discernible standards for political gerrymandering is elusive”); see also Issa-
charoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 574, stating: 
The normal distribution of populations across 435 congressional dis-
tricts will yield a range of districts, from those that are highly competi-
tive and will likely elect centrist candidates or swing from election to 
election between the two major parties, to those that are more politi-
cally homogeneous and will gravitate toward the poles of the political 
spectrum. 
 141 See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 809–10 
(2005). 
 142 See id. 
 143 See supra Parts II, III. 
 144 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004) (stating that under “a legisla-
ture that draws district lines with no objectives in mind except compactness and re-
spect for the lines of political subdivisions . . . [,] political groups that tend to cluster 
. . . would be systematically affected by what might be called a ‘natural’ packing ef-
fect”). 
 145 See supra Part I.  In addition to population inequality, the malapportionment 
cases also examined the shapes of various districts.  Id.  This measure is flawed in the 
gerrymandering context for the simple fact that “one-person, one-vote” requires that 
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has no corresponding objective measure, as inequality in the party 
strength is simply a function of individual politics and is necessary for 
the majority-rule principle contained in the Constitution’s guarantee 
of a republican form of government.146  Thus, unlike malapportion-
ment, an effects-based test is not sufficient for purposes of gerryman-
dering, because, regardless of whether a gerrymander has occurred, 
one political party will always lose.  In other words, the effects of a 
partisan gerrymander may be similar in many respects to a validly 
drawn redistricting plan that simply happens to contain a majority of 
one political party.147  The Court therefore finds itself taking a “how 
far is too far” approach, which assumes that particularly egregious ef-
fects may be unconstitutional.148
The legislature that takes into account partisan considerations 
wants the party in power to remain in power.  Simply measuring elec-
toral losses is ineffective at getting to the root of the apparent equal 
protection problem of gerrymandering: taking into account partisan 
considerations.  This is because it is difficult to determine objectively 
whether a political party lost with or without the help of a “political 
cartographer.”149
Perhaps recognizing this dilemma, some of those members of 
the Court that would hold such claims justiciable also attempt to dis-
cern the intent of the legislative body behind the redistricting plan in 
question, in order to punish impermissible partisan effects.150  “[A] 
straightforward application of settled constitutional law leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that the State may not decide to redistrict if 
its sole motivation is ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of 
racial or political elements of the voting population.’”151  However, 
discerning a predominant intent of the redistricting body necessarily 
involves inquiry into the effects of redistricting.  For example, the 
districts be drawn unnaturally, in order to contain an equal number of individuals.  
Thus, the shape of a district may simply be the result of completely legitimate redis-
tricting.  Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 165 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that “the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be determined by reference to the 
configurations of the districts”). 
 146 See McConnell, supra note 71, at 114–15. 
 147 See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 574. 
 148 See Berman, supra note 141, at 809–10 (noting that, in Vieth, “[f]or the first 
time, all the Justices agreed that the pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting is 
sometimes unconstitutional”) (citations omitted). 
 149 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 150 See, e.g., id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 151 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2634 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). 
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plurality opinion in Davis advocated that the plaintiffs prove “both in-
tentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an 
actual discriminatory effect on that group.”152  Such intentional dis-
crimination would be measured by criteria such as the shapes of vari-
ous districts.153  Similarly, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in Vieth 
that the “predominant intent” behind the legislative redistricting 
plan was a manageable measure of partisan redistricting.154  This 
would require a court to find such intent “if no neutral criterion can 
be identified to justify the lines drawn.”155  Likewise, Justice Souter 
would require that the plaintiffs prove, among other things, “that the 
defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the dis-
trict.”156  But Justice Souter’s argument that “proving intent should 
not be hard” exposes the fact that the proof of intent requirement is 
simply the inference drawn from the effects of the redistricting plan 
in question.157  Justice Souter notes that proof of intent would not be 
difficult once the plaintiff has shown: (1) that a correlation exists be-
tween the redistricting plan’s deviations and a negative impact on the 
plaintiffs’ political party and (2) that a redistricting plan with fewer 
partisan deviations exists.158  Because the measure of effects is not ap-
propriate in the gerrymandering context, this conceptualization of 
intent is likewise flawed.159  Unlike malapportionment, the effects of 
partisan gerrymandering are not objectively measurable with any de-
gree of ease or certainty.  Additionally, inquiring as to the intent of 
the legislature in hopes of discovering a partisan motivation is just as 
difficult because there is not likely to be any direct evidence of a legis-
lative body’s “state of mind.”  This has led several members of the 
Court to argue that such claims are not properly justiciable for want 
of “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it.”160  Indeed, the plurality opinion in Vieth felt compelled to over-
 152 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986). 
 153 See id. at 116. 
 154 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 155 Id. at 339. 
 156 Id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. 
 159 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 160 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Lewis, supra note 140, at 288 
(observing that the claim that “Bandemer’s intent-effect standard for partisan gerry-
mandering claims was a failure is a near-universal consensus”). 
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turn Bandemer in light of “[e]ighteen years of essentially pointless liti-
gation.”161
B. Overview of Alternative Proposals 
In addition to the various standards proposed by the justices in 
the foregoing opinions, there has been a multitude of proposed solu-
tions by scholars attempting to correct the Court’s failure to ade-
quately adjudicate claims of gerrymandering.162  Perhaps the most 
radical of these is the argument that neither malapportionment nor 
gerrymandering claims should be brought under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.163  However, this is a minority position, as most scholars 
recognize the reality that Baker and Reynolds will likely never be over-
turned.164  Indeed, the requirement of “one-person, one-vote” is 
“[o]ne of the most firmly established principles of constitutional 
law.”165  Thus, although some proposals put forth arguments outside 
of the Court’s current Equal Protection Clause framework, a realistic 
solution to the problem of gerrymandering must take into account 
the constraints posed by the requirement of “one-person, one-vote,” 
namely, the ability of legislatures to create artificial districts for the 
sake of equality. 
 161 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion). 
 162 See, e.g., Ryan P. Bates, Congressional Authority to Require State Adoption of Inde-
pendent Redistricting Commissions, 55 DUKE L.J. 333 (2005) (arguing that Congress has 
the constitutional power to require individual states to adopt bipartisan redistricting 
commissions, and that Congress should do so); JoAnn D. Kamuf, “Should I Stay or 
Should I Go?”: The Current State of Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication and a Proposal for 
the Future, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 163, 209–10 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims within a “freedom of association” 
framework); McConnell, supra note 71 (arguing that malapportionment and gerry-
mandering claims should be brought under the Guarantee Clause); Amy M. Pugh, 
Unresolved: Whether a Claim for Political Gerrymandering May Be Brought Under the First 
Amendment?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 373, 395–96 (2005) (concluding that political gerry-
mandering claims would be justiciable under the First Amendment: “[A]ny showing 
of governmental discrimination based on political affiliation towards political par-
ticipation in the electoral process, in association with a political party and in the ex-
pression of political views, will be subject to . . . strict scrutiny.”); Robert Redwine, Ra-
cial and Political Gerrymandering—Different Problems Require Different Solutions, 51 OKLA. 
L. REV. 373, 401 (1998) (arguing that, in order to protect the minority political party, 
approval of a redistricting plan should require a super-majority in the state legisla-
ture). 
 163 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 71 (arguing that malapportionment and ger-
rymandering claims would be better served if brought under the Guarantee Clause). 
 164 See id. at 103 (noting that “[t]here are no dissenters from that proposition on 
the Supreme Court, and there have been none for decades.  Legislatures, litigants, 
judges, and academics all accept the proposition”). 
 165 Id.  
FARLEY_FINAL_V2 1/7/2008  6:25:29 PM 
420 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:397 
 
 
These alternative proposals, however, will likely fail at the judi-
cial level for the same reasons the Court’s own proposed standards 
have failed: they presume that gerrymandering can be objectively 
measured.166  In addition, the sheer number of proposed solutions 
may in fact belie the Court’s acceptance of any one of them.  As the 
plurality stated in Vieth, “the mere fact that these four dissenters come 
up with three different standards—all of them different than the two 
proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed here by appellants—
goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally dis-
cernible standard.”167
In addition to these proposals, Congress has recently sought to 
regulate gerrymandering in congressional redistricting, with no suc-
cess.168  For example, in 2003 Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) proposed a 
bill to preclude mid-decade redistricting by limiting states, in district-
ing for the House of Representatives, to redistricting once every de-
cennial census “unless the State is ordered by a Federal court to con-
duct such subsequent redistricting in order to comply with the 
Constitution of the United States or to enforce the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 or otherwise enforce the voting rights of the people of that 
State.”169  In 1990, Congress proposed a bill that would regulate the 
redistricting process for the House of Representatives by providing, 
among other things, that “[d]istricts may not be established with the 
intent or effect of diluting the voting strength of any person, or 
group, including any political party.”170  The previous year, a similar bill 
was proposed that provided “[t]he boundaries of each district may 
not be drawn for the purpose of minimizing the voting strength of 
any racial, ethnic, or economic group, or for the purpose of favoring any 
political party.”171
A number of states have undertaken attempts to correct gerry-
mandering by requiring that redistricting be accomplished, not by a 
majority of the legislature, but by a neutral, bipartisan redistricting 
body.172  These states, through constitutional amendment, have 
 166 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 167 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 168 Id. at 276–77 (“Since 1980, no fewer than five bills have been introduced to 
regulate gerrymandering in congressional districting.”). 
 169 H.R. 2090, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003) (citation omitted). 
 170 H.R. 5037, 101st Cong. § 1(b)(4) (1990) (emphasis added). 
 171 H.R. 1711, 101st Cong. § 2(c)(2)(A) (1989) (emphasis added). 
 172 See Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans, http://www.senate.leg.state 
.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/red2000/apecomsn.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).  
The following states currently employ some form of a bipartisan redistricting com-
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sought to take the partisan legislature out of the redistricting process 
in order to ensure impartiality.173  Under this type of process, the leg-
islature generally chooses an even number of Democrats and Repub-
licans, and those individuals then choose a final member meeting the 
approval of both parties.174  States that require redistricting by a po-
litically neutral body have the advantage of ensuring a fair and bal-
anced method of redistricting without having to inquire into the ef-
fects or intent of the redistricting body, because a politically neutral 
plan is, in effect, a bipartisan compromise that does not simply have 
the best interests of one political party in mind at the expense of the 
other party. 
This type of plan also avoids the problems mentioned earlier 
concerning the Court’s failed inquiries as to the “effect” and “intent” 
of redistricting bodies because these inquiries are unnecessary when 
the process itself is immune from partisan influence.  “[T]he drafters 
of a bipartisan plan most likely lack discriminatory intent and are 
unlikely to draw a plan with severely discriminatory effects.”175  By 
preventing partisan considerations from entering the process of re-
districting at the outset, therefore, these states are assured that the 
redistricting plan itself is not an unconstitutional partisan gerryman-
der with respect to the intent of the bipartisan committee and the ef-
fects of the plan.  The “intent” and “effects” tests described through-
out the previous sections all attempt to discern whether the 
redistricting plan was influenced by partisan motivations.  By elimi-
nating partisan motivations at the outset, the state is assured of a le-
gitimate redistricting plan without the need for a post hoc analysis. 
An additional benefit of a bipartisan compromise is that it avoids 
excessive judicial oversight.  “When properly designed, such commis-
sions can moderate excessive partisanship without completely excis-
ing the political character of the process.”176  The concern of the 
mission: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  Id.  Maine and Vermont 
make such bipartisan commissions advisory only.  Id.  Connecticut, Illinois, Missis-
sippi, Oklahoma, and Texas use bipartisan commissions as a backup system in case 
the legislature fails to meet its deadline for submitting its reapportionment plan.  Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the People’s Business: An Examination of the 
Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 115, 118–21 (2004) (reviewing the common methods of achieving a bipartisan 
or nonpartisan redistricting commission). 
 175 Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 444 (1993). 
 176 Bates, supra note 162, at 352 (arguing that Congress has the constitutional 
power to require all States to adopt independent redistricting commissions). 
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Court in Gaffney v. Cummings, as well as in the more recent cases 
where members of the Court have argued against justiciability (i.e., 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Davis v. Bandemer and Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer), should be relieved to a certain 
extent.  By creating a bipartisan committee tied to the legislature, the 
Court leaves the redistricting process to the legislative branch while 
being assured that judicial oversight need only be minimal, as there is 
little chance for a partisan influence over the process of redistricting 
such that the Court must take the redistricting process out of the 
hands of the political parties.  While remaining political, therefore, 
redistricting becomes less partisan-influenced. 
IV. A WORKABLE SOLUTION 
A workable equal protection solution must respect the “one-
person, one-vote” jurisprudence that has become essential to modern 
day political districting.  In addition, such a solution must also recog-
nize the problems associated with gerrymandering and avoid the dif-
ficulty facing the Supreme Court as to discerning when such partisan 
districting has “gone too far” by examining the intent of the redis-
tricting body and the effects of such redistricting.  Finally, such a so-
lution should entail minimal judicial intervention, as redistricting is a 
political issue that does not lend itself naturally to judicial over-
sight.177  Taking these factors into account, it is clear that the Court 
should protect the process of redistricting in order to ensure that the 
intent of the redistricting body is nonpartisan and the effects of redis-
tricting do not simply protect the incumbents at the expense of the 
party not in power.  Courts could best accomplish this by creating an 
irrebuttable presumption of validity for any redistricting done by a 
bipartisan committee.178  “[I]t is obvious that any districting plan 
 177 See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring), stating: 
The opportunity to control the drawing of electoral boundaries 
through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and tradi-
tional part of politics in the United States, and one that plays no small 
role in fostering active participation in the political parties at every 
level.  Thus, the legislative business of apportionment is fundamentally 
a political affair, and challenges to the manner in which an appor-
tionment has been carried out—by the very parties that are responsible 
for this process—present a political question in the truest sense of the 
term. 
 178 Such a bipartisan compromise was seen in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 
(1973), where the Court upheld a plan designed by both parties in order to give 
proportional representation of party strength across districts.  See supra Part I.  Thus, 
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based on a bipartisan compromise should be upheld . . . .”179  Such a 
solution would work to practically eliminate gerrymandering: because 
an independent committee will not be motivated by partisan con-
cerns, the effect of any redistricting will not favor partisan prefer-
ences. 
For these same reasons the Supreme Court’s concern of intent 
and effect is relieved.  The creation of an irrebuttable presumption of 
validity will induce states to adopt independent committees to reduce 
litigation, avoid court-ordered redistricting, and assure voters that 
their right to vote remains protected.  An irrebuttable presumption 
for independent committees will also give those current members of 
the Court who favor nonjusticiability a workable and manageable 
standard for assuring Equal Protection in redistricting.  Furthermore: 
     In addition to reducing political bias in redistricting outcomes, 
independent redistricting commissions may have significant cor-
ollary benefits.  For instance, redistricting plans drawn by nonpar-
tisan commissions may increase the competitiveness of individual 
districts . . . . Theoretically, increased district competitiveness 
brings a corresponding increase in the responsiveness of district 
representation and may also marginally reduce voter apathy by 
removing one basis for the perception that individual electoral 
participation is irrelevant because electoral outcomes are a fore-
gone conclusion.180
Along with an irrebuttable presumption of validity for inde-
pendent committees, it is equally important to protect the process of 
redistricting by invalidating other processes as well.  Mid-decade re-
districting, such as was involved in Perry, should be held presump-
tively unconstitutional.  Only if the state can prove that the mid-
decade redistricting was done to reflect population changes more ac-
curately (and thus in compliance with “one-person, one-vote”) should 
that particular process be upheld.  The Equal Protection Clause “re-
quires actions taken by the sovereign to be supported by some legiti-
mate interest, and further establishes that a bare desire to harm a po-
litically disfavored group is not a legitimate interest.”181  Especially in 
the case of Perry, where the mid-decade redistricting was done shortly 
after a new political majority took office, mid-decade redistricting 
if the Court were to adopt this Comment’s proposal, it could cite Gaffney for prece-
dent. 
 179 Lewyn, supra note 175, at 445. 
 180 Bates, supra note 162, at 353. 
 181 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2634 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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carries an air of invalidity.182  Indeed, “the presence of midcycle redis-
tricting, for any reason, raises a fair inference that partisan machina-
tions played a major role in the map-drawing process.”183
Thus, the process of mid-decade redistricting should only be al-
lowed when it is related to a legitimate state interest, namely, redis-
tricting to correct for population changes in order to comply with the 
applicable law, including the “one-person, one-vote” requirement 
and the Voting Rights Act.  Although Justice Kennedy rejected this 
proposal in Perry,184 he was joined only by Justices Souter and Gins-
berg in that opinion.  Justices Stevens and Breyer held that mid-
decade redistricting is unconstitutional.185  Justices Scalia and Thomas 
would hold that such claims are not justiciable,186 and Justice Alito 
and Chief Justice Roberts have issued no opinion on the matter.  
Therefore, the option is by no means foreclosed.  Furthermore, the 
Justices in Perry dealt with the intent of the legislature and the effects 
of mid-decade redistricting.  Perhaps by refocusing the issue purely 
on protecting the process, the Court may gain at least five members 
who would hold mid-decade redistricting presumptively unconstitu-
tional. 
One issue that would require serious attention if this proposal is 
adopted is the Court’s role concerning states that fail to adopt an in-
dependent committee despite the practical benefits of doing so.  In 
order for the alternative proposal suggested here to have meaning, 
the Court must make it a more attractive alternative than doing noth-
ing.  At a minimum, the Court must continue to hold that gerryman-
dering claims are justiciable.  On this level, judicial involvement 
would most likely involve a case-by-case inquiry as to the processes 
used by a legislature in the course of redistricting.  Beyond that, it is 
presently unclear how the Court would treat gerrymandering claims 
concerning a redistricting done by a partisan legislature notwith-
standing the independent committee presumption.187  However, it is 
likely that the risk of a substantial majority of states failing to adopt 
such independent committees would be low, in light of the benefits 
associated with it and the public pressure that may come from voters 
 182 See id. at 2632. 
 183 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 367 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 184 Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (plurality opinion). 
 185 Id. at 2632–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 186 Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 187 For an interesting argument that Congress may have the ability to require 
states to adopt such independent committees, see Bates, supra note 162. 
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to approve independent committees to eliminate gerrymandering 
when the Supreme Court has made elimination an attractive alterna-
tive. 
Another potential issue is the selection of these bipartisan com-
mittees.  Currently, the states that employ such redistricting bodies 
have different processes to select committee members.188  It is vital 
that the selection of the committee members also be free from parti-
san motivations and that the committee accurately reflects independ-
ent bipartisanship.  Thus, the Court might be forced to set some cri-
teria for committee selection, such as the number of members, 
defining who selects the various committee members, and defining 
the population from which members are selected.  Because the Court 
would, in implementing an irrebuttable presumption, have no power 
to overturn a districting plan drawn by a bipartisan committee, the 
Court must make sure that the procedure by which the bipartisan 
committee is selected is not susceptible to partisan control.  One po-
tential solution would be to allow the Court to review and, if neces-
sary, amend the initial committee selection process, whereby chal-
lengers may assert claims that the selection procedure itself is faulty.  
This would ensure that the committee is truly bipartisan and thereby 
ensure that any resulting districting plan is not an unconstitutional 
gerrymander. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s difficulty articulating 
workable standards for adjudicating gerrymandering claims stems 
from the fact that the Court has attempted to measure such an Equal 
Protection violation by the effects of partisan redistricting, similar to 
the Court’s measure of violations with respect to malapportion-
ment.189  Unfortunately, there has been no sufficiently objective stan-
dard, so the Court has been fractured as to the justiciability of gerry-
mandering claims, as well as the considerations involved in finding 
constitutional violations.  Additionally, the constraint of “one-person, 
one-vote” provides cover for redistricting bodies that have partisan 
motives in mind because that standard requires artificial and fre-
quent redistricting.  Several states have attempted to solve this prob-
lem by requiring that redistricting be done by independent commit-
 188 See Confer, supra note 174, at 119–23.  
 189 See supra Parts I, II.  
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tees.190  This ensures that partisan intent remains excluded from the 
process, and that the effects of redistricting will be politically neutral. 
This Comment proposes that the Supreme Court take its cue 
from the states that have implemented a bipartisan redistricting 
commission and declare that redistricting by an independent com-
mittee is irrebuttably presumed to be constitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  This safe harbor will entice voters and legislatures 
alike.  Protecting the process of redistricting has the additional ad-
vantage of alleviating the concerns of the various justices who argue 
for nonjusticiability as well as ensuring that, for those justices who 
would require it, the intent/effect requirement is satisfied.  Protect-
ing the process of redistricting would be further accomplished if the 
Court were to hold that mid-decade redistricting is presumptively in-
valid and that only a showing of a legitimate state interest of preserv-
ing “one-person, one-vote” would suffice to rebut that presumption.  
It does, however, remain to be seen how the Court would treat those 
States that would continue to engage in partisan redistricting. 
Thus, by protecting the process, the Court ensures that Equal 
Protection is sustained by an objectively measurable standard, a stan-
dard that is judicially manageable and complies with the requirement 
of “one-person, one-vote.” 
 
 190 See supra Part III.B. 
